I would be supportive of working on SourceCred Dao as an Aragon DAO. This will offload a lot of the burden of writing secure smart contracts but it doesn’t offload the design of healthy institutional dynamics. Frankly, I think the “juggling razorblades” nature of writing secure smart contracts has largely forced the space to be dominated by the technical skills required to accomplish that feat, which are unfortunately often anti-correlated with the skills required for another kind of razor-blade juggling, design of institutions, which is inherently political economics.
I would argue that this thread merges with (and extends) this one:
The onus is on us to define a minimum viable institution, and then simply look to the smart contracts/tokens/bonding-curves/etc as tools automating the infrastructure of that institution.
In addition to the work on Fundraising by the Aragon Black team, I am also a big fan of the work underway by the 1hive team. Admittedly I am biased, they are working on a conviction voting implementation which is an algorithm i designed for shifting away from time boxed voting on proposals and moving towards something more like an accumulation of potential energy whereby proposals pass if and only if they surpass a particular activation energy.
The Aragon community is doing a lot of great things to provide infrastructure for a new breed of bottom-up opt-in institutions but I think as a community aiming to use these infrastructures we have a lot to learn about institutional economics.
Some recommended reading on Institutional Economics and Blockchain here: