I spent some time thinking about this back when starting up SourceCred, and I’m pretty sure I’ve worked out a construction with good properties, wh…
Out of my depth here, but appears like solid theory.
If we wanted to demo grain, we could just make an ERC20 token that is a placeholder, and then fork/migrate to a new contract when we’re ready for it. I like the idea of just paying out ETH to start though, it’s simpler.
That is the way…ERC20 infrastructure is such now that anyone can permissionlessly integrate with e.g. a DEX and have a market immediately. NC (NomanCoin)/ETH now trading.
Seems safer to never be sending the private keys over the internet. Also for some users this might be their first ETH address, and they might then do the very bad thing of using a wallet whose keys they got from someone else as their de facto main wallet. Better to not encourage bad habits, and instead have them generate the wallet and then we can send to it.
Starting out, it’s better to learn losing small amounts (opinion of some smart security people I follow). Also, the friction of having people create wallets could slow them down. The DAI burner wallet is a great example of super easy onboarding. Though if you’re talking about a crypto project, presumably everyone has a wallet already and this isn’t a problem.
Let’s suppose evil me sets up a cred donation instance for ETH developers. I do a good job building community and being really responsive to making the parameters work well, and so people start routing more and more funding through my portal. I get to the point where I have say, $100k/month in donations. Then one month I take all of the money and run, rather than sending it to real developers like I did all the previous months.
Exit scams will be a thing. But neither of us would have a job if 99% of people didn’t trust centralized crypto exchanges in the last couple years, many of whom have gotten hacked or exit scammed. Not trusting imposes a heavy tax. Also, if someone like yourself or another SC member did this, the reputational risk would be enormous. A human run operation in the early stages seems fine, and the quickest way to get started. Super secure smart contracts can be developed for millions of dollars once there’s millions of dollars in funding.
Yep, I describe a similar proposal in the other thread 2.
I totally accidentally stole your idea! Sorry about that. Good thing the internet captured it and cred shall flow to you for that one:)
Maybe once it’s produced a certain number of hops in save-pandaness it starts to regain fungibility, so that people who don’t have saving pandas as a terminal goal are still inclined to accept it in exchange for goods and services.
Reminds me of this guy, whose work I just found. Some deep thoughts on non-fungible tokens,
Take a look at the Odyssey hack design doc for an idea of what we’re thinking about.
This looks great. Another key piece of the puzzle. This is where non-code contributions can come in as well. So far the team seems to have answered all the big questions with actions.
Kind of like how voters in real democracy are incentivized to quickly vote ut corrupt politicians?
I would not propose traditional representative democracy (and don’t think that will work well in blockchains that are trying it). If you scrapped Maker DAO’s governance and just used the active voting smart contract, I think it works well. Unless a majority gain hold and tryany of the majority begins (in which case the community forks), any corruption/hack could be quickly voted out, and the consequences are time-bound. E.g. cred only flowed to the wrong people for a few days before people noticed. And I think people would be more responsive to money flowing out of their bank accounts than voting every two years for politicians that don’t meaningfully affect their reality.
Another approach is to just limit groups to small numbers of humans. The coordination is more limited on a global scale (although not if connected in a smart mesh somehow…), but you won’t need formal governance at all (or very light). Maker for instance made all of its decisions for the first couple years just informally. Rule was, if a proposed idea was not opposed, that was the community giving consent. This is largely how it operates informally in my project when it comes to tasks individuals want to do (and possibly get paid for).
Yeah, I agree. I talked to the founders about this a little while ago; they made the case that maintainer-ship is the bottleneck for OS projects, so only paying maintainers is fine. I disagreed, because even if this is approximately true right now, it creates really weird power dynamics and social dynamics and will be hard to fix down the line.
Initial conditions I are very important. Especially power dynamics. Once people have power and a mechanism to keep that power, they will try to keep it, regardless.