This is super helpful @DeltaFreq!
I think MKR stakeholders’ mental bandwidth may actually be the most scarce resource here. Optimizing for that makes sense. I also think that sourcing DAI from the flap auctions as you suggest might also be a good way to align MKR holder and contributor incentives. If contributors don’t get paid if MKR holders don’t, this will affect contributor decisions, especially if the reserve is running low. Security around income could be negotiated perhaps around the size of the rainy day fund, % diverted into the fund, or other clean mechanisms that are easy for all parties to understand. Which could be voted on by MKR holders when they vote on the other high-level parameters, such as the amount of DAI distributed every month, algorithms weights, etc.
Great to know this analysis is possible.
I would argue the value prop of SourceCred is, in a way, abstracting a way tons of complexity in regards to valuing contributions. Compared to the main SourceCred algo and the Maker system generally, the complexity of managing variable payouts from the protocol seems small by comparison.
Yeah, something like what you propos in Grainmaker P1 post could be totally workable and fairly elegant.
My sense from reading threads about this on the Maker forum is that some think “unbacked” DAI is fine, others have issue with it. Best to remove any cause for concern we can though.